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THE NEUTRAL PROSECUTOR:
THE OBLIGATION OF DISPASSION IN A
PASSIONATE PURSUIT
H. Richard Uviller"
INTRODUCTION
WHEN I was a young prosecutor in New York County,' the most
baffling part of my job was the decision-which I was regularly
required to make: what was the case at hand really worth? Two
notches below the grade charged in the top count in the indictment?
Half the maximum prison time the legislature had prescribed for cases
of this sort? Crimes are described in the penal law in their worst
manifestation. Indictments often compose a network of accusations in
the most serious degrees and combinations that the facts might
conceivably support. Occasionally-very rarely-a case comes along
that fits the most aggravated accusation the prosecutor can devise.
On such cases, the subsequent appraisal was easy: "top count; max
time." But even in the deliberate homicides, the major robberies, and
the brutal rapes, there was usually some room for a reconsideration of
the true gravity of the case. I have since come to understand that
these appraisals, or re-appraisals, of the worth of a case are an
indispensable-and largely healthy-part of the process. No less than
the power to charge, to dismiss charges, and to immunize witnesses,
the power to tailor a charge to the gravity of a particular offense and
the deserts of a particular offender is the essence of the executive
function in the prosecution of crime. At this point in my tour, I was
not assigned to try the cases I evaluated for disposition. So I could
ponder the elusive appraisal of worth in its full mystery.
As a trial Assistant, thumbing through the case jacket, talking to
witnesses, I could focus on only one question: what were my chances
of persuading a jury of twelve at a full-and fully contested-trial that
my charges were in all likelihood true? But even as I revisited the
plea offer with only the "triability" of the case in mind, I knew, and
still believe, that reading these portents is not the whole story. It is
not enough to say, as some have, that the just disposition of a criminal
* Arthur Levitt Professor of Law, Columbia University. I am grateful for the
contribution of my able Research Assistant, Wendy Witten.
1. I served as an Assistant in the office of Frank S. Hogan, District Attorney for
New York County, from 1954 to 1968.
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charge is the point at which the interests of the state in conviction and
of the accused in the lightest possible punishment intersect.2 There is
another, less pragmatic, element in the assessment of worth. I was just
too zipped, buckled, and helmeted into my flight suit at that point to
think about much else than the impending trial mission.
It is not easy to describe this normative element in the appraisal of a
case. It is in part a calibration of the level of contextual social
outrage. In part, it is the location of the particular instance of the
crime on a moral spectrum of similar crimes. In part, it is a reflection
of the customary level of punishment for crimes of the same category.
But, thankfully, I have no purpose here to attempt to discern-or to
defend-the retributive valence as it contributes to the resolution of a
criminal accusation. Rather, I hope to describe the process by which
the evaluation is made, and to call it "adjudicative" as distinct from
"adversary." And inasmuch as this adjudicative task is part of the
public prosecutor's executive function, I will argue that it should be
performed by members of the staff who are detached from the
demands of zealous advocacy.
As I shall describe the prosecutor's responsibilities, a third aspect
will emerge. Long before setting a date for trial, very likely before
opening discussions about disposition by guilty plea, the prosecutor
will be asking questions, possibly directing further interviews with
witnesses, examining documents, experts, reports; in short,
investigating the case. Overlapping somewhat with the adjudicative
function, this investigative responsibility also requires a level of
neutrality quite different from the attitude with which the prosecutor
prepares for trial. At the pre-adversary stage, I shall contend, the
prosecutor should be schooled in the detached exercise of discretion.
As facts are sifted and weighed, as the resulting accusation is assessed
for gravity, neutrality is a critical component of diligence. The
abandoned investigation, the light plea offer-these are no less
worthy accomplishments than the selection of a suspect to prosecute
to the fullest.
In that connection, I shall ask, too, whether the virtuous prosecutor
is not ethically constrained-if not legally 3-to inform the grand jury
2. Robert E. Scott and William J. Stuntz, for example, analyze plea bargaining
within classic contract theory in their contribution to a noteworthy Yale symposium
on the subject: Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 Yale L.J. 1909 (1992).
3. The United States Supreme Court decision in United States v. Williams, 504
U.S. 36 (1992), relieved the prosecutor of any legal obligation to present exculpatory
evidence to a grand jury. In that case, the Court declined to exercise its supervisory
powers to direct the prosecutor's performance before a grand jury, apparently leaving
the matter of fairness beyond legal control. See id. at 54-55. For a further discussion
of Williams, see infra note 19 and accompanying text. However, a recent statute,
known as the McDade Law, provides that U.S. government prosecutors must abide by
local rules regarding the ethical obligations of counsel. See 28 U.S.C. § 530B (Supp.
1999). This, the government now fears, may have overruled Williams in those
jurisdictions where the state prosecutor is under some obligation to present
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to whom he submits inculpatory evidence that there is support for a
conflicting hypothesis. Neutrality, I will suggest, puts the prosecutor
in the position of advocate for all the people-including the person
against whom the evidence has been accumulating. Thus, I will urge,
whatever the court's role might be in supervising the prosecutor
before the grand jury, the ethical imperatives require full and
balanced prosecutorial presentation. Finally, I will ask whether we
have imposed fundamentally inconsistent obligations on our
prosecutors, bending them into psychological pretzels by requiring
them to be the neutral investigator and the "quasi-judicial"
adjudicator while at the same time imagining themselves as the
zealous courtroom advocate.
I. THE ROLE OF THE PROSECUTOR IN THE AMERICAN MODEL
In the American model of criminal justice-in contrast to the
British, for example-the prosecutor is not just a lawyer assigned to
represent the interests of the government in the trial of a criminal
case. The American prosecutor, state or federal, is a public official,
elected or appointed to exercise executive authority. The prosecutor
doesn't have a client; he has a constituency. The local prosecutor is
not responsible to the state government but to the people directly.
The federal prosecutor is affiliated wvith, and in some sense subject to,
a department of the central government, the Department of Justice.
And the DOJ exercises a certain amount of supervisory control over
its far-flung district prosecutors. But essentially, all prosecutors-
unlike lawyers generally-enjoy independence in the exercise of
discretion. Free of client control, they have the luxury and burden of
developing the standards for the exercise of public authority. While
they function within the adversary system, they function also as
administrative policy makers. And, as such, they allocate resources in
the pursuit and disposition of cases according to their own best
judgment of the demands of justice.
As Americans have long known, and are beginning to acknowledge
openly,4 our system of criminal justice is compound and complex.
Only a relatively small proportion-an extremely important, but small
portion-of criminal cases are disposed of in anything resembling the
simple, traditional adversary mode of which we have been so
inordinately proud down through the centuries. The pristine
paradigm has, essentially, three sequential and intervoven phases.
The first is the commencement. Following an arrest predicated on
probable cause-and often very little more-or a grand jury
exculpatory evidence to the grand jury, thus converting the local ethical rule into a
federal obligation of law.
4. See, e.g., Symposium, The Changing Role of the Federal Prosecutor, 26
Fordham Urb. L.J. 347 (1999) (reflecting on the various roles and responsibilities of
prosecutors).
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indictment, the formal charge is lodged. Normally, the charge is the
result of the prosecutor's judgment, confirmed (usually pro forma) by
the grand jury in those jurisdictions that maintain the relic for the
ordinary felony case.' That judgment takes heavily into consideration
the likely outcomes of succeeding phases.
Phase two is investigation and trial preparation. Here, the
prosecutor begins the arduous process of getting all his witnesses and
documents in order, perhaps conducting supplementary forays to
patch and mend, to fill and brace, to trim and align the diverse, faint,
and chaotic traces of the facts clinging to the bare beams of the counts
in the indictment. In this, the prosecutor gets no help from the
accused, nor does he expect any. And in this old-fashioned paradigm,
the prosecutor does not share his discoveries with defense counsel,
who would be a fool if she did not react to such advance intelligence
by devising evasions and rehearsing counter-thrusts. If the defendant
has any colorable defense, let him develop it on his own. For his
response to the evidence adduced against him, he can wait for phase
three, the trial. After all, that's what a trial is for: to display in neat
and persuasive array the case against the defendant.
So the final phase is the adversary encounter. The burdened
prosecutor 6 parades his best case before a neutral and attentive panel
of citizens, each witness subject to vigorous challenge, perhaps
impeachment. The defense receives a full opportunity to contradict
the prosecutor's evidence, and the issue is finally submitted to the jury
for their secret and dutiful deliberation and (let us hope) their
indelible verdict. Through this critical third stage, the judge-fair,
detached, and in all likelihood ignorant of the facts-exercises her
passive control over the proceedings, maintaining order and assuring
the appearance of justice, while taking some pains to exhibit fidelity to
applicable law. But even the most participatory judge does not
presume to present or evaluate the evidence. There is some room in
this idealized version of the adversary confrontation for appellate
review, but not too much stress is laid upon it. It should be but an
emergency procedure to correct grievous and devastating deviations
from legal protocol by a foolish or foolhardy trial judge, or an
5. Twenty-three states and the District of Columbia have retained the indicting
grand jury for certain offenses. See Susan W. Brenner, The Voice of the Community:
A Case for Grand Jury Independence, 3 Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & L. 67, 101 (1995). Thesejurisdictions generally require an indictment for capital crimes and/or serious
offenses. See id. Two states, Connecticut and Pennsylvania, have abolished the
indicting grand jury by constitutional amendment. See id. at 102. All 50 states have
preserved the investigative grand jury. See Kathryn E. White, What Have You Done
With My Lawyer?: The Grand Jury Witness's Right to Consult with Counsel, 32 Loy.
L.A. L. Rev. 907, 925 (1999). England abolished the grand jury system in 1933. See
Susan M. Schiappa, Preserving the Autonomy and Function of the Grand Jury: United
States v. Williams, 43 Cath. U. L. Rev. 311,313 n.9 (1993).
6. By "burdened," I mean, of course, bearing the burden of proof.
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impulsive or ignorant prosecutor.
Add to this paradigm a dollop of discovery and a robust helping of
pre-trial motion practice and you have a recipe for a procedure
resembling today's trial regime. But what has been airbrushed out of
this adversary myth is adjudication by agreement, the so called "plea-
bargaining" and the demands it makes on the prosecutor to resolve
the case she intended merely to try. It is difficult, even in this record-
saturated world, to know precisely what percentage of the trial docket
is disposed of by guilty plea. Different jurisdictions vary in their plea
policies, and keep their records by significantly different schemes for
counting: if you include misdemeanors and petty offenses in the "trial
docket," the disposition-by-verdict column will shrink dramatically; so
too, if you include dismissals and consolidations with the guilty pleas,
the proportion of verdicts is further reduced. A crudely calculated
number that many commentators take as an honest estimate is 80% to
90% dispositions by guilty plea.7 Even at the high end of the estimate,
the cases that are tried to verdict remain a very important component
in the system, both for themselves (they are likely to be cases
involving major factual disputes or extremely serious crimes), and for
the influence they exert on the disposition policies regarding the
others (a couple of jury verdicts convicting tavernkeepers as
accessories to drunk driving will raise the plea offers in future
prosecutions).8 Thus, neither concern about the inefficiencies and
inequities of the adversary paradigm, nor efforts to improve upon the
method of adjudication of contested cases should be disparaged
because of the relatively few cases affected. At the same time, we
would do well to pay greater attention to the problems of prosecutor
as adjudicator.
Today, I believe things are much as they were in my time as a
prosecutor over 30 years ago.9 Young Assistants"0 think of themselves
7. Trials account for about 10%; dismissals may add up to another 5% - 10%. See
Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 Fordham L Rev.
2117, 2121 (1998); see also Robert C. Black, FIJA: Monkeywrenching the Justice
System?, 66 UMKC L. Rev. 11, 24 (1997) (stating that "[oInly about ten percent of
felony cases go to trial"); Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101
Yale LJ. 1969, 1978 n.22 (1992) (stating that the percentage of guilty pleas in federal
criminal cases fluctuates between 80% - 90%); William S. Laufer, The Rhetoric of
Innocence, 70 Wash. L. Rev 329, 374-75 (1995) ("Across the United States, the
percentage of felony arrests that are adjudicated at trial ranges from one percent...
to ten percent .... The national average is three percent."); Spiros A. Tsimbinos,
Limitations on Parole and its Possible Consequences, 13 N.Y. Crim. L News, April,
1996, at 1, 2 (noting that in 1995, only 5.7% of felony cases in New York State went to
trial, and 84.8% were disposed by guilty plea).
8. Cf Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 Yale LJ. 950, 951 (1979) (discussing when divorcing
couples will decide to go to court as opposed to reaching agreement though out of
court negotiations).
9. My colleague Jerry Lynch's description from his more recent experience
sounds very familiar to me. See Lynch, supra note 7, at 213641.
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primarily as advocates. The case they make, or (more likely) inherit
from a law enforcement unit, is cast immediately as a trial scenario. It
is refined and amplified-as it usually requires-in preparation for
exposure to a jury. In this posture, of course, the Assistant cares a
good deal more for supplementary information that fortifies the case
against the defendant than new data that call his thesis into question.
What is shared with the defense is shared reluctantly and only because
of the law's stern injunction,"a and what is received from the defense is
taken with suspicion and the assumption that, insofar as it contradicts
the prosecution version, counsel is likely to be disingenuous,
misinformed, or naive.
If and when the overture is made for a possible disposition by guilty
plea, the young gladiator is ready. It is all but routine. As others have
noted, the term "plea bargaining" or even "negotiating" is
misleading." Having spent several years in the process, I can vouch
that little, if any, haggling goes on in these sessions. For the most part,
the prosecutor announces to defense counsel the counts or crimes to
which he would accept a guilty plea in satisfaction of the entire
accusation, and perhaps-implicitly or explicitly-the sentence that he
would recommend or not object to. The announcement is not likely
to surprise experienced defense counsel. The proposal is the
composite of several factors: the stress of the docket backlog (a
parameter), the strength of the evidence (suspected by diligent
counsel), and a conventional "market price" for the particular
constellation of facts in the case. A robbery with a weapon but no
injuries by a defendant with only minor offenses on his record may go
for three years regardless of the legislative maximum for first degree
robberies. Counsel may argue: "This is no robbery! Your victim-no
10. Assistant United States Attorneys or Assistant District Attorneys are
commonly called "Assistants." They are, of course, technically assistants, but in fact
they are usually wholly autonomous, individually endowed with al the prerogatives of
the office they serve.
11. See Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1994) (requiring the government to produce
upon demand any available statement, made by its own witness, which relates to the
subject matter of such witness's testimony at trial); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87
(1963) (holding that "the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an
accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to
guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution");
Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a) (setting forth five categories of information which must be
disclosed by the government upon defendant's request). The Jencks Act and Rule 16
apply in the federal courts, and similar statutes have been enacted in most states. The
Brady rule applies in all criminal cases.
Another former prosecutor remembers that plea-inducing inculpatory information
was more readily imparted than potentially damaging exculpatory data. Maybe so.
But I still recall the sense that even inculpatory details, served up to wily counsel in
advance of trial, might well stimulate the artful construction of an evasive defense.
12. See Black, supra note 7, at 25; Lynch, supra note 7, at 2129. But see
Easterbrook, supra note 7, at 1972 ("Although the disclosure and assessment of
information [during plea bargaining] about innocence is imperfect, some defendants
can identify their status with high reliability.").
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winner himself-and my client had been drinking together and were
both drunk when my client got a little too insistent in trying to collect
an old gambling debt from his buddy." But the prosecutor has
probably already heard this story, and factored it into the winability
equation. So the offer stands, take it or leave it. 3
What is going on here? And how does it comport with our picture
of the prosecutor as advocate? Prosecutorial discretion in general and
the practice of plea bargaining in particular have attracted the
attention of generations of scholars and commentators. It is not my
present purpose to summarize-or to quarrel-with their work.
Rather, I propose to devote some paragraphs to the second question,
the role of the prosecutor, of which her performance in the drama of
plea bargaining is only a part. It is my thesis that we need to
reconceptualize the prosecutor to take account of her substantial
responsibility as investigator and, in a real sense, arbiter of the
accusation. Discharge of this major obligation, the wise exercise of
virtually unilateral discretion in the matter, demands neutrality, the
suspension of the partisan outlook, and at least until the case passes to
the adversarial stage, dedication to interests that may prove
antithetical to her ultimate position. And because these conflicting
obligations may impair quasi-judicial detachment, I will propose a
structural change that might better accommodate the neutrality of the
prosecutor in the pre-adversary mode.
I start with the faith that thorough investigation by a detached and
dedicated investigator is the best assurance of a conclusion that
comports with historical truth.14 I do not mean to say that the clash of
thesis and antithesis in a courtroom setting has not on occasion
revealed the truth. And I take full account of the social importance of
the public forum for dispute, and of the shows and trappings of the
law's dispassion. But I am far from confident that the devoted pursuit
of inconsistent contentions in the artificial setting of a trial readily
allows a naive and sheltered fact-finder to distinguish truth from
dissimulation, to tell the sturdy inference from the artful.' 5 Still, I
share with many observers some distrust of the free-ranging exercise
of official discretion. First, let us acknowledge that not all prosecutors
13. Of course, I do not mean to say there are no cases-particularly close or
complex cases-in which defense counsel may not bring some factor to the attention
of the prosecutor that alters the prosecutor's evaluation of the case. It is not,
however, a commonplace.
14. I have elsewhere expounded on this faith at somewhat greater length. See H.
Richard Uviller, The Tilted Playing Field: Is Criminal Justice Unfair? 73-112 (1999)
[hereinafter Uviller, Playing Field].
15. I should note here (with some astonishment) that judges with whom I am well
acquainted do not seem to share my misgivings, being, by and large, thoroughly
content that the adversary process delivers a close approximation of the truth in most
cases. See H. Richard Uviller, Virtual Justice: The Flawed Prosecution of Crime in
America 279-305 (1996) [hereinafter Uviller, Virtual Justice].
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are up to the task they have undertaken. Not all are diligent, learned,
or wise. And even the best of the prosecutors-young, idealistic,
energetic, dedicated to the interests of justice-are easily caught up in
the hunt mentality of an aggressive office.
Yet, I confess that notwithstanding the sporadic wimps and whiners,
the occasional Batmen and blockheads, from what I have known of
prosecutors and former prosecutors, I consider them by and large the
flower of the bar. At a critical stage in their careers, they have, or
have had, the supreme professional luxury known to the practice of
law: the blessing of working without regard to the interests of a
single-minded client. Virtually alone among their classmates-most
of whom were laboring in the competitive world of billable hours and
client promiscuity-they were told by their superiors: "Do only what
you think is right; bend every professional effort to achieve an
outcome that you think best comports with justice within the
constraints of law." And the instruction was sincere. Heady wine,
especially for a newly fledged lawyer. And in the best of the breed-
perhaps in most of them-assimilation of this extraordinary mission
gave rise to a conscious and conscientious project to refine their
judgment, to define for themselves the just provinces of law, and to
temper all with an acute appreciation for the demands of reality. If
discretion is to be lodged anywhere in the system-as it must be-I
tend to favor the prosecutor's office.
But, as I say, I am wary. I know that the earnest effort to do justice
is easily corrupted by the institutional ethic of combat. So long as the
prosecutor is primarily an advocate, sees himself, armor-clad,
prepared to do battle for what is right, detachment falters. I am, then,
seeking a way to capture the neutrality implicit in the mission as first
declared without undermining the adversary posture of the courtroom
advocate that the prosecutor may ultimately become.
It might be well to begin with an examination of the prosecutorial
responsibilities antecedent to the assumption of armor and lance. I
realize that there will be some old veterans who will snort: "There is
nothing antecedent to arming for battle. From first to last, the
prosecutor's duty is to advance the eventual triumph of the
government's case." And I know there is sufficient truth to that
proposition that I admit uncertainty about just where to inscribe the
line dividing the neutral prosecutor from the committed advocate.
But I shall try.
A prosecutor's first contact with a case comes in one of two ways.
Most commonly, and particularly on the state side (where the
overwhelming proportion of criminal prosecutions are found),
criminal cases begin with an arrest. The prosecutor greets the case,
along with the arresting officer, at the courthouse door. Some of
these arrests may be the product of long and painstaking investigation
by the law enforcement corps. In some jurisdictions, the custom may
1702 [Vol. 68
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be to consult with the prosecutor long before arrest in these
protracted police investigations, flipping the case into my second
category. But often-particularly where the local police have
experience and pride in their detection skills, the investigation that
precedes the arrest is a police operation exclusively. In these cases,
the police like to say: the case comes to the prosecutor "trial ready."
This is rarely the prosecutor's view, however.
Most of the other cases that come in for arraignment-cases in
which a more modest investigation, if any, preceded arrest-are grand
jury ready or information ready. An alert prosecutor at the
arraignment desk, however, will not automatically process what the
line officer brings in. At the very least, the complainant should be
interviewed first hand. Too, the facts must be reviewed to make sure
the officer has not mis-designated the offense. The result is that the
prosecutor, on first contact, does provide some filtration and a
number of these cases do wash out at the first stage. 6 Arraignment
must be prompt so the prosecutor has little time for preliminary
investigation. But between arraignment and accusation, the
prosecutor has an opportunity for some further inquiry. Prosecutors
realize that an indictment is more than a mere accusatory formality-
a piece of paper that serves only to bring the case to court, as judges
like to instruct juries. To the accused, it is an instrument of terror, to
say nothing of a major incision in the pocketbook (if the accused has
one). The conscientious prosecutor, then, will not be content with
"technical" sufficiency for the commencement of a criminal
prosecution. The prosecutor should be assured to a fairly high degree
of certainty that he has the right person, the right crime, and a good
chance of success with a petit jury. To reach that point of assurance,
the prosecutor should approach the case handed to him with a
working degree of suspicion. The good prosecutor-like any good
trial lawyer-is skeptical of what appears patent to others, and curious
concerning details that seem trivial to the casual observer. Looking
back on my own courtroom days, I now realize that I was weakest in
this essential characteristic of the best of the breed; in a word, my
gullibility and compassion dulled my suspicion and lulled my doubts.
The point being that even the cases presented wrapped and tied
with a ribbon-"we've got a positive ID by the complainant, an
independent witness who puts him at the scene, a patently incredible
16. In the federal system, from Oct. 1, 1995 through Sept. 30, 1996, of the 98,454
suspects in criminal matters, 58% were prosecuted in district courts, 33% were
declined for prosecution, and 9% were referred to federal magistrate judges. See
Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Compendium of Federal Justice
Statistics, 1996, 16 (1999). Of the 32,832 declinations, 27% occurred because of case-
related reasons (such as weak evidence); 23% occurred because there was no crime or
criminal intent; and 19% occurred for other reasons, such as agency requests and lack
of federal interest. See id. at 17. These statistics are also available in Bureau of Justice
Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice (visited Feb. 1, 2000) <http'//%wwv.ojp.usdoj.govbjs>.
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story from the perp, and a handsome criminal record"-deserves
further investigation. Positive IDs are frequently mistaken, on-the-
scene presence may explain his arrest but does not necessarily attest
to his culpability, "patently incredible" stories are sometimes true, and
there are many innocent people walking around out there with
criminal records. The mindset with which the prosecutor should
approach this task is different from the advocate shoring up a
somewhat equivocal case; it is the mindset of the true skeptic, the
inquisitive neutral.
Following a judgment of conviction, the prosecutor should maintain
her adversary stance, fighting off motions, writs, and appeals with
which the judgment is besieged: one juror told another juror during a
lunch break that the accused looked like a liar to her; during
deliberations, one juror shook his fist in the face of another; defense
counsel came back from lunch smelling of booze and dozed through
the afternoon; during her summation, the prosecutor hinted that she
and her office believed the testimony of the accusing witnesses; in his
charge to the jury, the judge hiccoughed meaningfully. All such
attacks on an adverse disposition must be resisted with full adversary
zeal.
But where a post-judgment motion goes directly to the issue of
guilt, the prosecutor is returned to the pre-adversary mode, and
neutrality must resurface. A critical prosecution witness recants; a
cop is accused of fabricating evidence in another case; a DNA test
discloses that the defendant could not have been the rapist. Upon
tenable grounds for such allegations, the prosecutor must resume the
role of neutral investigator. A thorough and dispassionate
investigation of the new development must be made and, where the
result warrants, the prosecutor must not hesitate to cancel the
victorious judgment and see that justice is done in the light of the
amplified or revised facts. We have read of instances in which DNA
evidence has unequivocally contradicted eyewitness testimony, and
the prosecutor refuses to join in the motion to set aside the prior
judgment or to move to dismiss the charges after the court does so.
This seems to me a grievous deviation from the role of neutral servant
of justice, which the prosecutor is duty-bound to fulfill. I do not say
that the prosecutor should cave at the first allegation of miscarriage;
the government's case, presumably, strong and convincing when tried,
does not become instantly so weak it can no longer support the
verdict. But a firmly based charge that a woeful mistake was made,
that an innocent person was convicted, is not to be taken lightly. We
know such mistakes are made (though we have no inkling how
frequently) and each one threatens the probity of the entire system.
All efforts must be bent to the diligent investigation of the claim and,
if substantiated, it is incumbent upon the people's representative, the
guardian of the integrity of the process, to urge immediate remedy to
[Vol. 681704
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assist the court in righting the vrong.
II. THE PROSECUTOR BEFORE THE GRAND JURY
The other way the prosecutor makes first contact vith a case occurs
long before it becomes a case. In this prenatal stage, the creature may
be no more than a whiff of suspicion. Our investigative grand jury,
the Supreme Court has told us forcefully, and more than once, is an
independent panel of citizens, free to follow its flimsy suspicions
wheresoever they lead.17 And the prosecutor, as their guide, may
stimulate those nascent hunches to reflect his own. So the decision to
put a matter into a grand jury, to open an investigation with the aid of
subpoenas ad testificandum and duces tecum, along with immunity if it
comes to that, is an exercise of discretion of some moment.'8 And,
with or without the grand jury behind him, the prosecutor may direct
the employment of a number of potent tools for uncovering evidence,
including search warrants, eavesdrops, and espionage. We are now
avowedly looking for evidence of criminal conduct of some sort by
someone. But it is well to remember that we are not yet prosecuting
any particular person for any particular crime. And suspects may be
exculpated along the line, as others may be drawn in. Indeed, the
whole venture may come to naught, the initial suspicion withering in
the light of further discoveries. And when that happens, let us hope
that the prosecutor, notwithstanding his own and his patient jurors'
investment in the project, will be courageous enough to fold his tent
and silently steal away.
At this exploratory stage, the relationship among the prosecutor,
the grand jury, and the court is a delicate balance of prerogative and
restraint. As a matter of form (and with some patriotic flourish), it
could be said that the grand jury-the citizenry-is sovereign in the
triumvirate. Though empanelled by the court, guided by the
prosecutor, governed to some extent by statute, and reporting to the
court, the choices of the ordinary folk sitting as a grand jury-where
to look, whom to hear, whom to immunize, what and whom to
charge-are theirs alone. Their prerogative, however, does not oblige
the prosecutor-their counsel-to bring to their attention all known
material for their consideration, not even matter which might lead
them away from indictment. As recently as 1992, the United States
Supreme Court declined to exercise its supervisory power to require
17. The most recent reminder from the Supreme Court was United States v.
Williams, 504 U.S. 36 (1992), which is discussed at supra note 3 and infra note 19 and
accompanying text. For older authority to the same effect, see United States v
Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 13 n.12 (1973); Hendricks v. United States, 223 U.S. 178 (1912);
see also, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 344 (1974) ("The grand jury's
investigative power must be broad if its public responsibility is adequately to be
discharged.").
18. See Uviller, Playing Field, supra note 14, at 32-72.
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the prosecutor to submit exculpatory evidence to the grand jury.
In United States v. Williams,19 the Court designated the grand jury
an accusatory rather than an adjudicatory body, and placed it outside
the supervision of the courts. John H. Williams, Jr., an Oklahoma
investor, was accused of misinforming a bank of his worth and income
in support of a loan application. After reading the grand jury minutes,
Williams moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that
documents and testimony concerning his knowledge of the value of
his assets had not been presented though the evidence had a bearing
on a material allegation of the indictment. Under Tenth Circuit
precedent, 0 the government bears a burden to submit "substantial
exculpatory evidence" that might affect the grand jury's decision
whether to indict.2 1 Accordingly, the motion to dismiss was granted
and the dismissal affirmed.'
In the United States Supreme Court, the case was important
enough to the Government to be argued by the Solicitor General,
Kenneth Starr, himself. General Starr opened to the court by
announcing the issue: "This case brings before the Court an issue
concerning the obligations of a prosecutor before a Federal grand
jury."' I think that states it exactly right. The Government, however,
immediately shifted the focus from the prosecutors' obligations to
"the concept of the grand jury's function."' 4 The Solicitor General
stated his theme thus: "The grand jury is a screening mechanism. It is
there to determine whether probable cause exists. It is not an
adversary proceeding, and thus historically, has not been charged with
evaluating defenses."'  This approach was echoed in the opinion of
the majority. Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, noted:
Although the grand jury normally operates, of course, in the
courthouse and under judicial auspices, its institutional relationship
with the Judicial Branch has traditionally been, so to speak, at arm's
length. Judges' direct involvement in the functioning of the grand
jury has generally been confined to the constitutive one of calling
the grand jurors together and administering their oaths of office. 26
He continued in this familiar vein, emphasizing the independence of
the grand jury. On this basis, the Court declined-as it has before-to
19. 504 U.S. 36 (1992).
20. See United States v. Page, 808 F.2d 723,728 (10th Cir. 1987).
21. The Government denies this legal obligation, but nonetheless assumes the
obligation as a matter of policy to present or disclose to a grand jury "substantial
evidence which directly negates the guilt of a subject." U.S. Dep't of Justice, U.S.
Attorneys' Manual § 9-11.233 (1987). See infra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
22. See Williams, 504 U.S. at 39.
23. Transcript of Oral Arguments for United States v. Williams, 1992 WL 687851,
at *3 [hereinafter Transcript].
24. Id. at *4.
25. Id.
26. Williams, 504 U.S. at 47.
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exercise its supervisory power over the functions of the grand jury.'
The Court further rejected any argument based on the Fifth
Amendment on the grounds that the right of indictment does not
imply a right to have the grand jury adjudicate the issue after a full
presentation of both sides of the issue.28
Powerful arguments. They demonstrate that the grand jury, an
independent body of citizens, enjoys considerable autonomy, and
functions to evaluate prosecution evidence only. But what does it say
about General Starr's opening question, what is the responsibility of
the prosecutor in the presentation of a case to them? Justice Scalia
comes eventually to that question. First, he rejects the notion that the
prosecutor is obliged to present a "balanced" picture of the events in
question. He writes:
If a "balanced" assessment of the entire matter is the objective,
surely the first thing to be done-rather than requiring the
prosecutor to say what he knows in defense of the target of the
investigation-is to entitle the target to tender his own defense. To
require the former while denying (as we do) the latter would be
quite absurd.29
It is not a wholly persuasive argument. Requiring a prosecutor to
acquaint a jury with all evidence known to him on a critical point
hardly requires abandonment of the ex parte mode. It does not seem
absurd to me that we entrust to the grand jury's counsel the duty of
balanced presentation rather than having the "target" (whoever he
may turn out to be) present his own "defense" to an unknown and
inchoate charge.
Justice Scalia's principal argument, however, is that the prosecutor
has no greater obligation of presentation than to provide what the
grand jury requires for its accusatory purposes.-0  He spells out the
point thus:
Respondent acknowledges (as he must) that the "common law" of
the grand jury is not violated if the grand jury itself chooses to hear
no more evidence than that which suffices to convince it an
indictment is proper. Thus, had the Government offered to
familiarize the grand jury in this case with the five boxes of financial
27. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349 (1974) (rejecting the
proposal that the exclusionary rule be applied in grand jury proceedings); Costello v.
United States, 350 U.S. 359, 364 (1956) (declining to apply the hearsay rule in grand
jury proceedings).
28. See Williams, 504 U.S. at 53. In pertinent part, the Fifth Amendment
provides: "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or
public danger...." U.S. Const. amend. V.
29. Williams, 504 U.S. at 53.
30. He is not alone in this view. The Court of Appeals of the State of New York,
for example, agrees. See infra notes 41-43.
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statements and deposition testimony alleged to contain exculpatory
information, and had the grand jury rejected the offer as pointless,
respondent would presumably agree that the resulting indictment
would have been valid. Respondent insists, however, that courts
must require the modern prosecutor to alert the grand jury to the
nature and extent of the available exculpatory evidence, because
otherwise the grand jury "merely functions as an arm of the
prosecution." We reject the attempt to convert a nonexistent duty
of the grand jury itself into an obligation of the prosecutor. The
authority of the prosecutor to seek an indictment has long been
understood to be "coterminous with the authority of the grand jury
to entertain [the prosecutor's] charges." If the grand jury has no
obligation to consider all "substantial exculpatory" evidence, we do
not understand how the prosecutor can be said to have a binding
obligation to present it.
31
Again, Justice Scalia's logic escapes me. Defense counsel has no
obligation to offer in evidence material that he has received by
discovery; he may surely ignore the evidence as "pointless." But the
nonexistent duty of counsel does not diminish the obligation of the
prosecutor to furnish the discoverable evidence. The authority of the
prosecutor to seek an indictment is not at issue here. And I certainly
hope that the Court is not saying that, like the grand jury, the
prosecutor should look no further than the barely sufficient evidence
that would warrant an accusation.
Although a grand jury does not normally concern itself with
questions of credibility, and they rarely deliberate on the nicer
questions of intent, their superficial consideration does not relieve the
conscientious prosecutor of the obligation to do both. Moreover, if
the result of the prosecutor's investigation is ambiguous, it might be
well for the prosecutor to acquaint the grand jury with the conflict in
evidence and seek from them a resolution. The faint flavor of
"adjudication" in such a process should not offend either Justice
Scalia or the precedent he cites. In my experience (on the state side),
one of the substantial virtues in working with a grand jury is that
occasionally, the uncertain prosecutor can seek the detached advice of
the panel. I recall in particular a charge of corruption against a police
officer who insisted he was innocent and had bank records that he
claimed bore him out. I was very glad to put the conflicting evidence
before my citizens' panel and ask them in effect: what do you think?
Is this evidence strong enough to warrant prosecution to a petit jury?32
I hope Justice Scalia does not imply that, as a prosecutor, I should not
fully explore and consider evidence of innocence because a grand jury
31. Williams, 504 U.S. at 53 (citations omitted).
32. To be sure, I was working under a state law that entitles a potential defendant
to be heard by the grand jury considering the evidence against him, and empowers a
grand jury to hear such defense evidence as it chooses to. See N.Y. Crim. Proc. §
190.65 (McKinney 1993).
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need not.
Exploration and consideration by the prosecutor of conflicting
evidence does not necessarily translate into a duty to present the
whole ball of twine to the grand jury. And the grand jury is not, as
Scalia rightly points out, under any obligation to expand it's inquiry
beyond the minimal scope of the evidence required to support an
indictment.3 3 But the obligation of the grand jury is not at issue, and
the prosecutor may have a greater obligation to acquaint the jury with
investigative products than the jury has to consider them. What I fail
to understand is the Court's failure to understand how the prosecutor
may have a professional obligation to present what the grand jury has
no obligation to consider. By acquainting the grand jury with the
existence of evidence critical to an issue before them, though
inconsistent with the theory of culpability, the prosecutor fulfills her
duty as counsel to provide the jury with the option to inform itself as it
chooses.
Consider this little paradigm. The prosecutor has a simple bank
robbery with four eyewitnesses and little else, two tellers and two
nearby patrons. None suffers any impairment to perception or
credibility. Three make a certain, positive identification, and the
fourth is equally confident that the robber was not the defendant.
Should the prosecutor, having presented the testimony of the three,
inform the grand jury that a fourth contradicts them? Or is it enough,
as Scalia would have it, that the evidence of the three is sufficient to
support the indictment? Many people would argue that though one
identifying witness suffices, if three said the robber was not the
defendant, the prosecutor should not present the case at all. A two-
two split probably calls for very careful evaluation of the other
circumstances and the relative vantage of the positive and negative
witnesses, and probably should be a grand jury call in the end. But it
does seem pretty clear to me that the division with which I began,
three positive one negative, is a case that should be presented with
advice to the jury concerning the dissent, if not actual testimony from
the dissenter. The point of this little exercise is to demonstrate that it
is not enough for the conscientious prosecutor to present the evidence
sufficient to support the indictment.
It may be that the prosecutors' duty of impartial investigation
derives neither from the Fifth Amendment right to accusation by
grand jury nor from any rules of grand jury procedure enforceable by
the courts.34 But if-as I contend-there is such an obligation, John
33. See Williams, 504 U.S. at 53.
34. It is interesting that, despite the challenge of the Chief Justice at the oral
argument, the Solicitor General maintained in answer to a question from Justice
O'Connor at the outset of his oral argument, that an indictment should be dismissed
where the prosecutor knowingly put material false evidence before the grand jury.
General Starr relied on the law in several circuits, with which the Government had no
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Williams' suggestion that "the modern prosecutor [should] alert the
grand jury to the nature and extent of the available exculpatory
evidence" should not be so summarily rejected. Even conceding the
fullest autonomy to grand juries, prosecutors are their counsel and
may be expected to discharge that office by informing the jury of the
evidentiary options. Grand juries, not withstanding their non-
adjudicatory role, may be expected, as citizens, to consider the
appropriateness of indictment in addition to the sufficiency of the case
supporting it. And the existence of substantial evidence inconsistent
with guilt may properly influence their judgment.
I do not mean to say or imply that the neutral prosecutor's
obligation of fairness requires the presentation of all evidence, or even
all evidence that might be evaluated as helpful to the future
defendant. Desirable as it might be in an ideal world, practical
considerations all but obliterate this idea. In a case of any complexity,
the files of the prosecutor would be overwhelming to a grand jury
without prudential editing. And there is no reason why such an
inordinate burden should be laid upon the hapless citizens whose ill
fortune brought them into assembly as a grand jury. So too, the
obligation to present all possible exculpatory evidence would fall afoul
of practical problems of recognition. In the early stages of
presentation, the prosecutor himself can hardly recognize the
documents, the fragments of testimony that point away from
accusation, much less any judge attempting to supervise the
performance of the prosecutor. And the last thing I hope to do is to
encumber the process further with wrangles after the fact about
whether the prosecutor should have known its significance, and
should have offered to the grand jury this or that item that might have
affected their resolution.
Rather, I am proposing that the neutral prosecutor, despite the
unsupervised license accorded by Justice Scalia & Co., should inform
the grand jury of evidence known to the prosecutor that, if true, would
substantially undermine the thesis of culpability, discredit witnesses
on whose credibility the prosecution case depends, or tend to establish
a substantial defense of excuse or justification. Although to the
Government, this proposal may sound more in terms of policy than
law, I am heartened to know that, as such, they endorse it, despite
Williams. The famous Department of Justice Manual which, in twelve
loose-leaf volumes, advises the constituent prosecutors on a few
essentials of the job, then set forth:
[I]t is the Department's [of Justice] internal policy... [that] when a
prosecutor conducting a grand jury inquiry is personally aware of
quarrel. See Transcript, supra note 23, at *5-*6. The Solicitor General might have
also mentioned Section 9-11.233 of the U.S. Attorneys' Manual, entitled
"Presentation of Exculpatory Evidence." See U.S. Dep't of Justice, U.S. Attorneys'
Manual § 9-11.233 (1987); supra note 21.
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substantial evidence that directly negates the guilt of a subject of the
investigation, the prosecutor must present or otherwise disclose such
evidence to the grand jury before seeking an indictment against such
a person.35
While a failure to follow the Department's policy should not result
in dismissal of an indictment, appellate courts may refer violations of
the policy to the Office of Professional Responsibility for review.
Presumably, the announced policy has moved U. S. Attorneys to bring
evidence contrary to the theory of prosecution to grand juries with
little fuss or bother. Some judgment is doubtless called for in
differentiating the "substantial evidence" from the trivial, and that
which "directly negates" from that which only indirectly casts doubt
on guilt, especially at the early stages of an unformed case, but
apparently the DOJ expects no less.36
If I were to move the obligation from policy to law, I would
encounter two major problems. The first is that I would insert
detached judicial oversight into what has been heretofore a wholly
precatory duty, obedience or disregard being all but invisible. Though
I can hear the Attorney General protest the "interference" of the
courts, I hardly consider the fairness of the prosecutors' performance
as being a matter of executive turf. And with the Department's
acknowledgment of the importance of the imperative ("must present
or otherwise disclose" 37), they can hardly be heard to protest the
courts' efforts at enforcement. The second of the problems is the
creation of yet another "technical" grounds for adversary combat.
Even an obligation limited to the big ticket items invites contention
and drags the reluctant court into yet another mire of post facto
litigation.
The rule-clogged American machinery of justice can ill-afford new
engagements for the judicial resolution of loosely articulated
constraints of prosecutorial propriety. I am deeply sympathetic to this
complaint, I hasten to say. But I must also say that, when it comes to
causes and grounds for litigation, I count among the more important
those that have a direct bearing on guilt and innocence. And even at
the indictment stage, sparing the innocent the injury of indictment and
the burden of trial is among the more worthy reasons to litigate. The
best defense of the grand jury is today, as it has always been, that it
provides a citizen panel to review executive decisions to prosecute.
35. U.S. Dep't of Justice, U.S. Attorneys' Manual § 9-11.233. Oddly, (despite the
fact that it is cited with approval by dissenters), Justice Scalia does not allude to this
document. Though subsequently amended to take account of Williams, there was no
substantive change in the Manual, as reproduced herein. The implication is
unmistakable: the stated policy of the United States is "quite absurd." See supra note
29 and accompanying text.
36. Id.
37. Id. (emphasis added).
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And particularly in dubious cases where evidence on vital elements
conflicts, that shield is meaningful only if the grand jury has
knowledge of and access to exculpatory evidence. I believe that
prosecutors know this, that the injunction of the DOJ Manual is
generally observed, and that the court will have little to do in the way
of enforcement. And to the extent that the odd (or routine) motion
raises the issue of a substantial prosecution dereliction, decision
should not be unduly burdensome to a court accustomed to resolving
similar allegations.
Even without quarreling with the Supreme Court's sparing
application of its supervisory jurisdiction in Williams, I do wish that
they had not characterized the investigating prosecutor as exercising
authority "coterminous" with the grand jury, but rather had
underscored the prosecutor's unique obligation of impartiality. For,
though the grand jury be not adjudicatory, the prosecutor, I claim, is
necessarily so at the investigatory stage. And we need some good
clear recognition of this aspect of the job.
I cannot help but note that, in addition to its hazy logic, the Court's
opinion with respect to "coterminous" obligations stands on dubious
authority. The case quoted by Justice Scalia for this critical phrase,
United States v. Thompson,8 is a 1920 decision on the question
whether the prosecutor must seek the approval of the court before
submitting to a second grand jury charges on which the first grand jury
had failed to indict. The Government, defending the second
indictment, asserted that certain propositions were well established
law in the United States, among them:
That the United States district attorney, in virtue of his official duty
and to the extent that criminal charges are susceptible of being
preferred by information, has the power to present such
informations without the previous approval of the court; and that by
the same token the duty of the district attorney to direct the attention
of a grand jury to crimes which he thinks have been committed is
coterminous with the authority of the grand jury to entertain such
charges.39
Thus, it appears that the phrase the Williams Court quoted-voiced
to support a totally different proposition-was merely the
Government's contention in Thompson, not the opinion of the Court.
The Thompson Court's majority opinion by Justice White does later
use the word "coterminous." It appears in a convoluted sentence that
is part of the Court's explanation of why the "exception" requiring
court approval for resubmission is inconsistent with the "rule"
regarding the authority of the prosecutor to present cases to grand
juries. The Court's sentence (employing slightly different language
38. 251 U.S. 407 (1920).
39. Id. at 413-14 (emphasis added).
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from that quoted by Justice Scalia) follows:
[B]ecause, while the general rule which is stated establishes the
authority of the district attorney as official prosecutor, and makes it,
as we have seen, coterminous with the right of the grand jury to
consider, the exception subjects that authority to the exercise of ajudicial discretion, which, as well illustrated by the case under
consideration, destroys it.40
In all, this authority provides weak support, if any, for the Court's
major assertion.
Finally, in the interests of caution, I should emphasize that my
quarrel with Williams and my regret that the duty of presentation was
so narrowly framed should not be read to advocate broad judicial
review of the depth and breath of the prosecutor's presentation to a
grand jury. Even the State of New York, to choose one example, a
jurisdiction that recognizes the obligation of the prosecutor to
fairness, premised on the "familiar doctrine that a prosecutor serves a
dual role as advocate and public officer... [and is] charged %vith the
duty not only to seek convictions but also to see that justice is done,"'4
does not require full presentation. "[T]he People maintain broad
discretion in presenting their case to the Grand Jury and need not
seek evidence favorable to the defendant or present all of their
evidence tending to exculpate the accused."42 Rather, the Court of
Appeals in New York has set forth, as the flexible standard for the
obligation to acquaint the grand jury with a defense, the following:
"whether a particular defense need be charged depends upon its
potential for eliminating needless or unfounded prosecution."' '
III. THE DUALITY OF THE PROSECUTOR'S RESPONSIBILITY
To return, then, to the bifurcated responsibilities of the prosecutor,
what sort of mindset is called for by this extraordinary task? Can we
expect a dispassionate investigator to maintain the initiative, to persist
in the pursuit of elusive veils of suspicion, to summon the energy to
pore through cartons of documents, interview dozens of reluctant and
prevaricating participants in the hope of finding a case buried in the
haystack? Or is it only the taste of the trial to come that fires the soul
of the investigator? It may well be the latter, I know. But my
experience is that, in the investigative bureaus of my shop-especially
the commercial frauds bureau-the prosecutors did not really expect
that a trial would result from their prodigious labors. By the time they
40. Id. at 415.
41. People v. Pelchat, 62 N.Y.2d 97,105 (1984).
42. People v. Mitchell, 82 N.Y.2d 509, 515 (1993) (citing People v. Lancaster, 69
N.Y.2d 20,25-26 (1986)).
43. People v. Lancaster, 69 N.Y.2d 20, 27 (1986) (quoting People v. Valles, 62
N.Y.2d 36,38 (1984)).
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had assembled a case warranting indictment, the guilty plea was
virtually assured. Indeed, the object was to close every loophole so
securely, to knit the skein so tightly, that surrender was the
defendant's only option. And of course, from the purely tactical
standpoint, one way to assure the guilty plea was to cut loose any
suspects who had a tenable defense. That requires an open mind and
a relentless pursuit of possible defenses not only to destroy the
untenable, but to honor the tenable.
For the cases in which the prosecutor expects a resolution of the
accusation by guilty plea, as well as for the ordinary case working its
way up the docket toward a jury trial, the prosecutor must pause and
consider what is the just disposition of the case by agreement?" Since
docket economy is an ongoing imperative, some discount is probably
granted solely in exchange for bypassing the trial and appeal.
Projected success with a jury counts too. But underlying the state's
accord to a reduction in the top count penalty must be a defensible
assessment of the gravity of the crime and the deserts of the
defendant.
This process looks a lot like adjudication. Not the familiar
adversary process of adjudication, but a model closer to the civil law
system. In the European model-sometimes called, disparagingly,
"inquisitorial" by those in our "adversarial" tradition45-a semi-
judicial figure (called in some places a juge d'instrucion) supervises
the investigation and prepares the detailed, all-but-dispositive
accusation in the dossier. In the prevalent mode of American
adjudication, the prosecutor emerges from her role as ex parte
investigator to preside over the disposition of the accusation she has
brought. Of course, the judge will actually preside, ultimately
reviewing the case and authorizing the agreed upon resolution. But, if
the parties have done their work truly and well, there will be little left
for the court to adjudicate beyond signing off on the disposition
approved by the prosecutor.
Again, we see our prosecutor in a role quite different from that of
the gladiator, his mind set on the public exposure of his skills and the
mettle of his cause in the colonnaded arena. Is this, should this be,
can this be the same person imbued with the same ethic of the same
office?
I think it would be well if we recognized the difficulty of sustaining
the detachment of an adjudicator with the commitment of an
advocate. Prosecutors were not designed to be both simultaneously.
The adjudicatory function evolved from the simple surrender of a
44. It should be acknowledged that today, in many jurisdictions, the appropriate
resolution by guilty plea is agreed upon before the accusation is filed. See 5 Wayne R.
LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 21.1(h), at 30-31 (2d ed. 1999).
45. I have to confess that I do not rest my patriotism on pride in the adversary
system. See Uviller, Virtual Justice, supra note 15, at 241-65.
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guilty plea-a matter between the confessing defendant and the
judgmental court. With increasing regularity, counsel for the penitent
began to visit the prosecutor's office in search of some extra
consideration in exchange for the client's guilty plea. As long as
pleading guilty meant only throwing oneself upon the mercy of the
court-meaning, hoping for leniency within the court's sentencing
discretion-the prosecutor was no part of the transaction. But where
the prosecution's recommendation was solicited in support of the bid
for lenity or, more likely, some adjustment in the accusation was
sought to facilitate the award of a lighter sentence, the prosecutor
became a critical player in the disposition drama. Under federal and
many state constitutions, the grand jury was the accusing authority,
and even the court, alone, could not redact their charge.
Traditionally, pardon and clemency were reserved to the executive,
descendant of the divinely-endowed monarch. And modifications to a
less from a more serious charge are variants on the forgiveness power.
Hence, laws such as New York's' specifically require the consent of
the executive officer, the prosecutor, for dismissal or acceptance of a
plea to a charge less than the grand jury's top count. So, as courts
increasingly deferred to the judgment of the prosecutor who,
presumably, represented the interests of the law-abiding community,
the prosecutor gradually displaced the court as the arbiter of a just
resolution.47
How does the prosecutor meet the demands for quasi-judicial
performance? As others have noted, and many lawyers know from
personal experience, prosecutors perform this prerogative largely by
unarticulated, unreviewed, intuitive standards proudly designated
"the interests of justice." The question of whether these standards
should be written and promulgated, and thereby somehow achieve the
status of law is a difficult and debatable point. I do not mean here to
enter the debate on this question.4  It is sufficient for present
purposes to note that in the performance of the quasi-judicial role, the
prosecutor should be sufficiently detached from his prospects as an
46. See N.Y. Crim. Proc. §§ 210.20,210.40,220.10,220.50 (McKinney 1993).
47. Of course, the prosecution cannot enter the guilty plea, but with some judicial
input, the recommendation of the prosecutor usually becomes the disposition of the
court.
48. But if pushed, I would probably vote negative if for no other reason than
reluctance to introduce yet another ground for procedural challenge. In-house
articulation of customary practice is doubtless a healthful exercise. But once the
standards are known (as they shortly would be), the office suffers the unnecessary
headache of defending its own decision against the claim that its own standards were
ignored. Moreover, there is considerable doubt that a working articulation could be
compiled even were it desirable to do so. Either it would be bland and flexible or
voluminous and rigid. And our sour experience with the federal sentencing guidelines
counsels against another effort to tote up of the values of the multiple variables of
fact, the strength of case, the moral gravity of crime, and the criminal history of
defendant that animate the discretionary decisions.
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advocate to reach a dispassionate appraisal of the interests of justice.
I believe that for the office of prosecutor faithfully to discharge the
incompatible roles of advocate and arbiter, the investigators and
adjudicators should be segregated from the advocates. I do not say
that the two bands can not live happily under one roof, both
responsible to the same chief. But I do think that those who
investigate, assess, and negotiate settlement should belong to a
different cadre from those who try the cases that fail to reach accord.
Since the disposition of a charge should never ignore entirely the trial
potential of the case, I would staff my adjudicative team with trial
veterans. And insofar as the trial process may abort at any time and
the question of a fair disposition raise its head anew deep into the trial
process, I would have stage one and stage two prosecutors collaborate
on its resolution. With these and other adjustments for overlap, I
would encourage my adjudicators to celebrate their dispassion, to
relish their role not only as the fact-seekers initially, but the justice-
seekers ultimately. These people should be honored by defense
counsel and judges, along with their colleagues, for their devotion to
the right result regardless of adversarial considerations. And where
they find it impossible, for one reason or another, to adjudicate the
case by accord, they should step out of it and turn the cause over to a
warrior to take into battle.
There is some (though inadequate) recognition of the importance of
these values in the bureaucratic arrangement in some large offices
that disempowers trial assistants from granting immunity to witnesses,
dismissing indictments, or accepting pleas to reduced charges. These
adjudicative decisions must be approved by senior supervisors. One
may assume that the supervisors are trial veterans with some degree
of detachment, if not neutrality. It's the right idea. But such
supervision is often nominal at best since the senior assistant knows
only what the young trial assistant tells him and is inclined to approve
any reasonable course the trial assistant advises. As I envision the
ideal arrangement, the senior "adjudicative assistant" would have
exclusive control of the case from inception, through investigation and
accusation, and into plea assessment and whatever negotiation
accompanies it. The case would be surrendered to the young
gladiator-the "adversary assistant"-only when all else fails. And
any future plea overtures would be considered only with the advice of
the adjudicative assistant.
I am told that the glamour factor cuts against this scheme. Trial
assistants are the stars of an office and the most desirable recruits to
the private sector to which they will, most likely, graduate. Under my
regime, investigators and plea bargainers would be seen as mere
clerks. Look at the American trial mythology. Or compare the
romance of the English barrister with his dull compatriot, the solicitor.
I am not so sure. For one thing, wealthy, prominent leaders of the bar
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on either side of the Atlantic are likely to be solicitors or the
American analog, lawyers who do not take cases to trial. For another,
from my own experience I believe that if the normal routine was to
put juniors in court and to reserve the more mature and experienced
assistants for the pretrial stage, the office ethic would soon reflect the
fact--especially since the assistants themselves would recognize the
just allocation of responsibility. While many lawyers might relish
exposure on the evening news, I think by and large that sort of
glamour pales fast.
More troublesome in my plan is a factor I have tried to ignore, but
every experienced trial dog will attest to its importance. The strongest
impetus to disposition by guilty plea is the imminence of trial. Any
well-run prosecutor's office hates the last minute, eve-of-trial
repentance, the desperate attempt (often abetted by the judge) to
revive a lapsed offer as the prospective jurors file into the courtroom.
Defendants are told in the strongest language that an offer must be
seized at once or lost forever. But I am forced to conclude there is
something about the criminal mentality that blocks reception of the
message. They persistently hope for miraculous deliverance-a vital
prosecution witness will step in front of a truck, an unintelligible
motion will hit the magic number and the indictment will vaporize, the
prosecutor will get married and lose interest in prosecuting the case.
Somehow getting away with it is the ethic of the trade. It is only at the
very last minute, as the jury is being empanelled, that the accused will
face the inevitability of judgment; only at this point is he ready to
accept the fact that surrender is the wisest course. And I well
remember my reluctance to revive the offer when my defendant
belatedly faces the music-I had gone to expense and trouble
assembling all my witnesses, I had put in many hard hours preparing
for the trial. I was up for it. I thought the defendant should pay for
his tardiness with a higher plea.49 But it is hard to fight with a judge
who urges you to relent, arguing: if the disposition was right last
week, it must be right today.
My plan virtually ignores the imminence factor insofar as it assumes
that the evaluation of the case will be done well before the jury call
goes out. And I should recognize that there will inevitably be many
cases in which the first serious approach to the prosecutor regarding
disposition will be made to the trial assistant. Yet, I maintain that the
position of the trial assistant if and when she gets that telephone call
will be greatly aided, and office policy will be stabilized by the earlier
work done by the adjudicator. There is no reason that I can imagine
why the late broach of the possibility of plea should not return the
case to the pre-adversary mode, with the added factor that the trial
49. Of course, it can be-and has been-argued vigorously that the higher
sentence is, or is not, a premium exacted for the exercise of the right of conviction by
trial. I do not venture into that topic here.
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assistant can now offer the additional input that she wants very much
to go to trial-or is reluctant to do so.
CONCLUSION
So, in sum, I see prosecutors as executing multiple functions within
three general categories: investigative, adjudicative, and adversary.
The first two of these call for a quality of professional disposition
different from the last. Investigation and adjudication call for
neutrality, while the trial mode of the advocate demands full partisan
commitment. Passion and dispassion are not cut from the same
mentality. Dedicated detachment is a precious quality in a public
prosecutor, difficult to cultivate and best developed at some remove
from the adversary zeal that characterizes the trial phase.
Conscientious commitment to an office policy or tradition goes a long
way toward the ideal of quasi-judicial performance. So, too, effective
and devoted supervision can imbue the line assistance with an
appreciation of his or her dual responsibilities. But neither
commitment nor supervision of this sort can be generally assumed.
Indeed, enjoining the same person to be at once neutral and
contentious may induce some discomfort. So I propose that some
structural reflection of the bifurcation in prosecutorial function might
encourage development of both orientations. Recognition of the
division by separating the Assistants who assemble and evaluate
evidence from those who present it in adversary form to a factfinder
might enhance both commitments.
1718 [Vol. 68
